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Properties:
♦ Components:
z Units of composition
z Independent deployment
Support reuse
z Independent development
z Contractually specified 
interfaces
Only explicit context 
dependencies
Support configuration
Platforms:
♦ Java Beans/EJB
♦ COM/DCOM/COM+
♦ CORBA component model
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Component security:
♦ Security objectives of distributed 
and mobile code systems
♦ New security objectives due to 
large number of principals:
z Protection of an application 
with respect to component 
attacks (confidentiality, 
integrity, availability,...)
z Protection of an application 
against a wrong coupling of 
components
z Protection of component 
vendors against wrong 
incriminations
z Trust management
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Security Wrapper:
♦ Component contracts contain 
descriptions of security aspects
Model of legal interface actions
♦ Component in question is 
wrapped by an adapter
Interface traffic via adapter only
♦ Observer checks actual behavior 
against contract models
z Adapter reports interface traffic 
z Observer checks interface event 
for compliance with the model 
z If an event is wrong,
» the component is blocked 
» the application 
administrator is notified
Adapter
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Runtime Auditing
Application
Admin Requi-
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Directory
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process dfh2(SellerAdr : Any)
var S : set of SellerAdr ;
init ≡ S = { } ;
actions
DirOfS_read(sell : set of SellerAdr) ≡ S‘ = sell ;
IfToS_ReqTender(Saddr : SellerAdr) ≡
Saddr ∈ S ∧ S‘ = S ;
end ;
cTLA:
♦ Temporal Logic
♦ Based on TLA
♦ State-Transition-
Systems
♦ Coupling by syn-
chronously executed    
actions
Contract:
IfToS.ReqTender(Saddr)
always only if after reading
S=DirOfS.read()
Saddr is member of the set S
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Component Contract Policy Patterns:
♦ Confidentiality:
z Restriction of data flow
z Deterministic behavior to prevent 
hidden channels
♦ Integrity:
z Constraining of interface events 
and their arguments
♦ Availability:
z Minimum waiting times to 
prevent denial-of-service attacks
z Maximum waiting times to 
prevent blocking of components
♦ Non-repudiation:
z Logging of events at a trusted 
third party service
Runtime Auditing
» Data flow access
» Data flow history
» Hidden channel functional 
dependency
» Hidden channel enabling 
history
» Hidden channel exec. time
» Integrity enabling condition
» Integrity enabling history
» Denial-of-service minimum 
waiting time
» Denial-of-service enabling 
history
» Blocking maximum waiting 
time
» Blocking enabling history
» Event logging
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Trust Information Service:
♦ Collects good and bad 
evaluations on a component
♦ Calculates and offers trust values
Trust
Information
Service
Trust Manager:
♦ Varies enforcement depending on 
the current trust value:
z Full observation
z Spot checks 
z Remove wrapper
♦ Causes sealing of a component 
after an alarm message 
♦ Replies inquiries from the Trust 
Information Service
♦ Notifies the Trust Information 
Service about severe violations
Trust
Manager
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Trust Management Support
Trust modeling:
♦ Trust values:
z Interval [0,1]
z Triple <b, d, u>
» b: belief
» d: disbelief
» u: uncertainty
b + d + u = 1
♦ Opinion triangle (Jøsang)
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Uncertainty
0
0
0
1 1
1
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d
♦ Trust value determination
z Calculation from the number of
» positive experiences p
» negative experiences n
♦ Metric of Jøsang, Knapskog:
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uz Metrics:
» Jøsang, Knapskog:       
liberal philosophy
♦ Metric of Beth, Borcherding, Klein:
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» Beth, Borcherding, Klein: 
unforgiving philosophy
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Trust Management Support
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Trust Information Service:
♦ Storage of
z Component trust values
z Recommendation trust 
values of component users
z Trust values are stored based 
on ciphers
Privacy improvement
♦ Computation:
z Experience reports are 
checked for validity
User’s trust value
z Component trust values are 
computed by means of the 
subjective logic
♦ Application:
z Security wrapper control
z Procurement decisions
Trust
Value
Manager
Cipher
Service
Experience
Report
Checker
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E-Procurement Application Example
Application:
♦ Commodity management 
of fast-food restaurants
♦ OBI (Open Buying on  
the Internet)
z Tender and Order 
formats
z B2B model
♦ Component system:
z Restaurant, Counting 
Stock, Catalog, Sellers 
adapted from the 
SalesPoint-Framework
z OBI-E-Requisitioner, 
OBI-Buying Adapter, 
Logging Service
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E-Procurement Application Example
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OBI-B2B model:
1
1. Ask buying organization 
for sellers
2.1
2.2
2.3
2. Request sellers for 
tenders
3.1
3.2
3.3
3. Receive tenders from 
sellers
4.2
4.14. Select winning seller and 
generate an order
5.2
5.1
5.3
5. Send order to the 
winning seller
6. Fulfill order
7. Pay order
OBI-
E-Requisi-
tioner
Counting
Stock
OBI-
Buying
Adapter
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♦ Availability (4 policies):
z Preventing denial-of-service 
attacks by demanding minimum 
waiting times between calls
z Guaranteeing contemporary 
orders by demanding maximum 
waiting times for relevant steps
♦ Non-repudiation (1 policy):
z Logging tender requests, tenders, 
and orders at the logging service
E-Procurement Application Example
Critical Component:
♦ OBI-E-Requisitioner
Security Policy Enforcement
13 policies based on the patterns:
♦ Confidentiality (4 policies):
z Relevant information is only 
forwarded to appropriate sellers
z Hidden channels are not used to 
send competitor’s tenders
♦ Integrity (4 policies):
z Relevant variables of the 
environment components are not 
altered
z All selling organizations have a 
fair chance to win the order
z The ordered amount is sensible
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E-Procurement Application Example
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Wrapper enforcement policies:
♦ Application security policy:
z Highest security level:     
always full observation
z Medium security level:     
Metric of Beth et al.;              
» spot checks: b > 0,9999    
(7000 positive reports)  
» wrapper removed:               
b > 0,99999              
(11600 positive reports)
z Lowest security level:      
Metric of Jøsang, Knapskog; 
» spot checks: b > 0,99        
(p ≥ 100 · n)
» wrapper removed:              
b > 0,999 (p ≥ 1000 · n)
Adapter
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♦ Availability (4 policies):
z Preventing denial-of-service 
attacks by demanding minimum 
waiting times between calls
z Guaranteeing contemporary 
orders by demanding maximum 
waiting times for relevant steps
♦ Non-repudiation (1 policy):
z Logging tender requests, tenders, 
and orders at the logging service
Runtime overhead:
♦ 5.4 % by run-time enforcement
♦ Reduction to 3.2 % by using trust 
management
E-Procurement Application Example
Critical Component:
♦ OBI-E-Requisitioner
Security Policy Enforcement
13 policies based on the patterns:
♦ Confidentiality (4 policies):
z Relevant information is only 
forwarded to appropriate sellers
z Hidden channels are not used to 
send competitor’s tenders
♦ Integrity (4 policies):
z Relevant variables of the 
environment components are not 
altered
z All selling organizations have a 
fair chance to win the order
z The ordered amount is sensible
15P. Herrmann, L. Wiebusch, H. Krumm: Trust-Based Runtime Monitoring
Concluding Remarks
Introduced:
♦ Runtime auditing of components 
♦ Trust management support
Other Application of Component 
Contract Models:
♦ Formal Verification at design time 
z Contract models fulfill global 
security models
Web-page: 
ls4-www.cs.uni-dortmund.de/RVS/P-SACS/
To do:
♦ Runtime auditing:
z UML models instead of cTLA
♦ Trust management support:
z System risk analysis to define 
wrapper enforcement policies
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